There has been a buzz in the media about the need for dedicated bomber aircraft for the Indian military’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Some armchair strategists are pitching for having dedicated aircraft for strategic bombing tasks, independent of the IAF. The SFC, created in January 2003, forms a part of India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), responsible for the management, administration and operational orchestration of the nation’s tactical and strategic nuclear arsenal. It has the responsibility of initiating the process of a nuclear weapon delivery air-, sea- or land-based after the necessary approval by the NCA.
A traditional nuclear triad comprises aerial bombers, submarines and land-based missiles, including tactical nukes. Though, thankfully, no nuclear weapons have been employed since the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings of 1945, existing nuclear command authorities have been modelled on Cold War formats and India would have a similar arrangement in place.
The critical consideration against having a dedicated SFC strategic bomber fleet is the astronomical cost. For example, the next-generation B-21 Grumman strategic stealth bomber is expected to cost around $0.5 billion each, the upgradation bill of the Pentagon triad for the next decade totalling around $350 billion over a life cycle. Clearly, neither is such a humongous outlay affordable nor is it warranted, given our nation’s security situation. For countering nuclear threats (given our existing no-first use policy) against China and Pakistan, India would need to structure a nuclear response within the existing fighter force structure and our Prithvi IIs and Agni Vs.
Be that as it may, it needs to be understood that though assets may be forked out to the SFC, the strategic air campaign would be one of the operational tasks for the IAF and can never be divorced from it doctrinally. So, even if the NCA tomorrow decides on a first-use nuclear policy, the strategic assets would be part of the overarching IAF air campaign. Role-dedicated bombers would be called for only in case the peculiarities in weapon load dictate so. Most nuclear weapons could be delivered by a suitably modified SU-30, Mirage 2000 or Rafale, the LCA Tejas or even a Jaguar.
The strategic depths envisaged in Pakistani and Chinese target areas would not call for other long-range, but vulnerable, bomber aircraft for weapon delivery as our tactical aircraft fleet could well undertake the tasks with extended ranges, if required, enabled by aerial refuelling.
There has also been talk of acquiring the Blackjack TU-160 or its follow-on PAK DA fifth-generation fighter for the IAF to showcase its ‘strategic’ mindset. In the foreseeable future, the IAF would continue to be a ‘balanced air force’, orchestrating all its air campaigns seamlessly and harmoniously as the war progresses and would be labelled as strategic or tactical, depending on the important mission objective. Doctrinally, a tactical fighter can carry out a strategic role, such as the MiG21 formation from 30 Sqn Rhinos attacking the East Pakistan Governor’s palace in Dhaka during the 1971 war, which virtually terminated the war and created Bangladesh on our terms — a strategic end, no doubt.
From the days of the dedicated Canberra bomber aircraft in the late 1960s, practitioners of air power in the subcontinent and the Indo-Pacific have come of age. The IAF has since articulated and has a viable air power doctrine in place and expects to let that document dictate its operational stance in any future war.So, to talk of putting in place a dedicated strategic bomber fleet at this stage of our evolution as an air power entity of some credibility would be rather naïve and a retrograde force accretion. Are we talking of expeditionary missions for the IAF, such as what the USAF had to undertake in Afghanistan post 9/11, in the Gulf air campaigns or possibly would need to do later if there’s a standoff with the PLAAF over Taiwan? Or, are we looking at prosecuting an air war in tune with what the Union War Book dictates as the roles and missions of the IAF?
It is my strong belief that the IAF should continue with its present envisaged acquisition plans centred around SU30s, Rafales and the AMCA (Advanced Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) to be able to prosecute all our air campaigns effectively. The counter-air campaign could be addressed by the SU30s, Mirages and Rafales, whilst the Tejas, Jaguars and MiG 27s would handle the counter-surface forces and maritime missions. The Rafales and the SU30s (with augmented refuelled ranges) could well take on the strategic air campaign as envisaged for targets in our areas of interest.
Earmarking a certain number of longer-range fighter assets for the SFC may not be a bad idea, no doubt. But those assets are not meant to be divorced from the overall air tasking for the Chief of the IAF and could well be switched to other tasks or targets, as a dynamic war situation warrants.The Russia-Ukraine war has shown how a determined air force, albeit beefed up materially by supporting allies, can hold out and achieve considerable aerial success against a much stronger adversary. Of course, it has been a limited war to an extent and strategic targets were not engaged, other than some old nuclear power plants or formation headquarters. The railways and hydel power stations have been largely left undamaged.
So, in any future IAF air campaign planning, the focus needs to be on target-specific aerial missions in the strategic domain to break the enemy’s will to fight. Choosing the otherwise redundant or inapplicable strategic bomber route will be infructuous in getting us the desired operational answers.
